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Legal Informality and Redistributive
Politics
by William H. Simon

I. Introduction
Until recently, one of the most consistent themes in both
right and left critiques of the legal system has been the repudiation of procedural formality, that is, of specialized, rule-bound
procedures. The left critique portrayed formality as facilitating
the manipulation of the legal system by the privileged to the
disadvantage of others. Both right and left critiques portrayed
formality as expressing and fostering alienation and antagonism.'
In recent years, however, attitudes toward formality on
the left have become increasingly complex and ambivalent.
This development may be partly a reaction to the rising prominence of a conservative rhetoric that links proposals for
informalization with conservative substantive goals, such as
reduction in civil rights or welfare rights enforcement. 2 It may
be partly an expression of disappointment over the results of the
Neighborhood Justice experiments. 3 And it may be partly a
reflection of the studies in the two volumes of The Politics of
Informal Justice, edited by Richard Abel. No one is likely to
come away from these remarkable volumes with the idea that
informalization per se invariably or even presumptively serves
the interests of the disadvantaged. The Abel studies illustrate
again and again how broader social inequalities can be reproduced
and exacerbated in informal dispute resolution procedures ostensibly designed to enhance access of the disadvantaged.

The author is William H. Simon, an Associate Professor of Law at
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, (415) 497-4605. Professor
Simon was formerly a staff attorney at Greater Boston Legal Services.
1. For a historical survey of informalism, see J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WrrHotrr LAWYERS? (1981).
2. See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2,000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, 70 ER.D. 83 (1976).
3. See Merry, Defining "Success" in the NeighborhoodJustice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING
IDEA 172-202 (Tomasic & Feeley ed. 1982).
4. THE POLITCS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982).

In these circumstances, a few critics, including Abel and
some of his collaborators, 5 appear to be attracted to a notion
diametrically opposed to the traditional presumption that informality benefits the disadvantaged. This is the notion that, at
least in the general conditions of contemporary America (or
contemporary advanced capitalism), informalism tends to worsen the situation of the disadvantaged. The argument is not
merely that most particular instances of informalization have
harmed the disadvantaged-since no one has attempted a broad
enough survey to advance such a clain--it is that structural
features of the legal system and society make them more
susceptible to advocacy on behalf of the disadvantaged in
formal rather than informal contexts.
In this comment I suggest that it is unlikely that such an
argument could be sustained. I begin by examining the antiinformalist argument in the context of a striking case study
from the Abel collection and by arguing that the significance of
the study is far more limited than the anti-informalist argument
suggests. I then suggest that there are theoretical problems with
terms and concepts such as "state power" and "social control"
upon that the argument against informalism depends on. And
finally, I sketch an alternative account of the significance of
informalism in contemporary redistributive politics.

II. The Anti-Informalist Argument
The anti-informalists raise two general concerns. First,
they fear that informalization will deprive the poor of strategic

5. See Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in I POLITCS

OF

267-320 (R. Abel
ed. 1982); Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control
Problems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, id. at 207-48;
Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls,
INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

id. at 119-62.
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advantages that arise from formal procedural rules. 6 Antiinformalists recognize that formal rules can be designed to
serve the interests of the privileged; indeed they insist that most
rules are so designed. But they emphasize that the inflexibility
of formal rules means that these rules serve their purposes
imperfectly. The over- and under-inclusiveness of formal rules
with regard to their purposes means that such rules, even when
designed to serve the privileged, create pockets of leverage that
are potentially available to the disadvantaged. Informalization
can eliminate this leverage and turn procedure into a more
flexible and precise instrument of the goals of the privileged.
Second, the anti-informalists fear that informal procedures will induce resignation to or contentment with oppressive
relationships. They argue that the alienation of which the
traditional left critique complains can sometimes be a good (or
at least second best) thing. The tendency of procedural formality to distance the parties from each other and to legitimate
antagonistic behavior may encourage the disadvantaged to challenge oppressive relationships. Conversely, informal procedures
may undercut alienation only to promote a false sense of
integration with hierarchy.

Anti-informalists also fear that informal
procedures will induce resignation to or
contentment with oppressive relationships.
Both of these points are simply variations on the classical liberal defense of the rule of law. 7 The classical liberals and
the left anti-informalists both see procedural formality as an
essential safeguard of the freedom and well-being of the disadvantaged. But while the classical liberals see the rule of law as
an ultimate utopian goal, the left anti-informalists see the rule
of law as a temporary strategic concession.

A. Strategic Advantages
These concerns are illustrated in an essay by Mark
Lazerson in the Abel volumes. 8 Lazerson describes how a
"strategy of legal formalism" employed with initial success by
lawyers on behalf of poor tenants in the South Bronx was
ultimately defeated by informalizing reform. The strategy was
initially formulated in response to several circumstances. The
condition of most of the housing occupied by poor tenants in
the area was substantially below the requirements of the housing code. Although state law gave tenants the right to have the
premises repaired to code and to receive an abatement of rent
for the time when the premises were substandard, this right was

largely unenforced. Municipal court judges and clerks were
unsympathetic to tenants, and tenants could not navigate the
court's complex procedures on their own. Landlords, benefiting
from both greater expertise and the sympathy of the court
personnel, got what they wanted quickly, usually in the form of
default judgments. Lawyers in the federally funded legal services program adopted a strategy designed to exploit the procedural formality of the eviction process. The lawyers sought to
defend with aggressive formalism the largest possible number
of evictions. They generated evictions by encouraging tenants
with habitability complaints to withhold rent in accordance with
state law. They then used procedural tactics to maximize the
expense and delay to the landlord. They attacked technical
defects in the service, the summons, or the pleadings, frequently winning dismissals. They put landlords to proof on issues,
such as ownership, that were undisputed and conventionally
waived. They prolonged trials by unnecessarily detailed examinations and by pointless but technically permissible evidentiary
objections that would ordinarily have been waived. The goal of
this strategy was not merely to benefit clients in the cases being
litigated, but to create a backlog in the court that would
increase the leverage of tenants generally in negotiations with
landlords. The courts had been heavily dependent on high
default rates to clear their dockets. Even a small decrease in the
default rate-say, from 90 to 86 percent-could enormously
increase the trial rate-say, from 4 to 8 percent-and create a
massive backlog. Since the principal burden of delay was on
the landlord, who was unlikely to receive any rent for jhe
period of the litigation, tenants gained a great deal of leverage.
The legal services lawyers were able to settle the cases on more
favorable terms because of the threat of expensive procedural
jousting and delay.
This strategy succeeded to the extent of generating a
sense of crisis among court officials and landlords. The response was legislative reform designed to informalize the eviction procedure. Spokespeople for both landlords and tenants
supported informalization both as a means of reducing delay
and expense and as a means of improving habitability
enforcement. 9 Informalization involved the elimination of technical procedural requirements, the replacement of judges with a
larger number of lower status hearing examiners unsympathetic
to procedural objections, and commitment to a norm of flexible
and expeditious claim determination. According to Lazerson,
these informalizing reforms thwarted the legal services strategy
by undermining the bargaining positions of tenants in eviction
cases without any corresponding increase in the efficacy of
housing code enforcement.
Those who believe that the market swiftly translates
tenant gains against landlords into either higher rents or
abandonment would question whether the South Bronx legal
services strategy could have in fact accomplished significant
redistribution even prior to the informalizing reforms. Others
would question the ethical propriety or the political viability of
the strategy. However, I find the strategy is plausible as a

6. 1 focus on procedural rules because they are the main concern of
the recent anti-informalist literature. However, much of the same
analysis applies to the issues of formality in substantive law. See
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).

7. See F. HAYEK, THE ROAD
8. Lazerson, supra note 5.
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72-87 (1944).

9. The streamlined procedures were supposed to facilitate prosecution
of landlords by tenants and housing officials as well as evictions.

matter of redistributive politics and ethically defensible.' 0 My
doubts concern Lazerson's interpretation of his story as evidence for the general principle that, at least when the disadvantaged are demobilized and quiescent, "procedural fairness and
blind, mechanical application of the rules are the best defense
of the subordinate classes."" ! In fact, the initial success of the
South Bronx litigation strategy seems to have depended on a
series of fairly specialized circumstances. The tenants had
substantial access to legal services. The burden of initiative was
on the landlords. The landlord-tenant relationship was such that
the costs of formality were not ultimately reimposed on the
tenants.
1. Legal Services
Formal systems tend to be more difficult for people
without special training or experience to participate in. Nothing
in the South Bronx story casts doubt on the traditional assumption that lay people without professional assistance will do more
poorly in a formal proceeding than in an informal one. It
appears that most tenants facing eviction do not have represen-2
tation and that most unrepresented tenant defendants default.,
It is plausible that many of these tenants might benefit from a
variety of informalizing reforms. For example, one study of the
introduction of simplified summonses and notices in a court
noted for its hostility to tenants found that even in such an
inauspicious setting the reform produced modest but significant
benefits for tenants.1 3 More importantly, there are a variety of
more sympathetic forums in which disadvantaged claimants
routinely have significant success. 14 During recent periods,
more than a quarter of unemployment insurance claimants and
more than a third of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) claimants, most of whom were unrepresented, succeeded

10. For a critique of the economic argument, see Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE L.J.
1093 (1971). One premise of the economic argument that is
probably inapplicable to the South Bronx strategy is that of
uniform enforcement. The South Bronx strategy seems compatible
with a selective enforcement practice that would be relatively tough
on low-cost, inframarginal landlords and relatively lenient on
high-cost, marginal landlords in order to avoid driving the latter
from the market. See id. at 1112.
On the ethical and political arguments, see Bellow &
Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:Confronting Scarcity and Fairness

in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS

REV.

337 (1978); S.

(1974).

I1. Lazerson, supra note 5, at 159.
12. See Cunningham, The New Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URBAN L. ANN.

145, 145-48 (1979) (summarizing studies).
13. Rose & Scott, "Street Talk" Summonses in Detroit's LandlordTenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J.
URB. L. 967, 992-95 (1975) (decreases in default rates of between
2 and 16 percent depending on case and form types).
14. Judgments about whether informal procedures benefit the disadvantaged are speculative since they depend on controversial assumptions about (1) the appropriate procedural baseline for comparison
(what formal procedure would govern in the absence of the informal one)? (2) the appropriate substantive baseline for comparison
(how should the cases come out given the applicable substantive
law)? and (3) the ultimate incidence of the costs and benefits of
formality. For example, some interpret the high success rates of
creditor-plaintiffs in small claims courts to suggest that this type of
informalization primarily services the interests of creditors. See
386

at adjudicatory hearings in those programs, and about half of
the unrepresented social security disability claimants succeeded
at hearings. ' 5 Most people believe that an important measure of
informality is essential to the accessibility of such proceedings
to claimants.' 6 For many years the welfare program that was
widely regarded as the most responsive to claimants--the veterans' pension program-was
also regarded as one of the most
17
informally administered.
The welfare hearing systems are far from perfect, but
their informal procedures facilitate a far more meaningful degree of participation by unrepresented claimants than any other
formal system I can think of, and sympathetic and competent
official performances are not uncommon. The most serious
problems with welfare administration concern, not the hearings
procedures, but the frontline bureaucracy and most problems
arise from the tendency of increasing formality in
administra8
tion to encumber claimant access to the system.'
Of course, informality does not invariably benefit the
disadvantaged. If officials are hostile, informality will not
protect the disadvantaged from their hostility, but neither will
formality if the claimants lack representation.

14. (cont.)
Note, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 237 (1951). But: (1) If the appropriate baseline is formal
judicial proceedings in which defendants are unrepresented, it does
not seem implausible that the disadvantaged do somewhat better in
informal small claims proceedings. Cf. Sarat, Alternatives in
Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 339, 367 (1976) (unrepresented defendants, but not
plaintiffs, appear to do better against represented adversaries in
informal rather than formal small claims proceedings). (2) The
high success rates could mean that creditors, because of their
greater expertise, are better at selecting out relatively unmeritorious
cases before going to court. See Priest, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. I (1984). (3) Savings in collection
costs may benefit nondefaulting debtors in the form of lower
prices.
15. U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, QUARTERLY PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE STATISTICS, JAN.-MAR. 1981 22, 25 (1981) (among

FY 1980 AFDC appeals, 42 percent, excluding those settled or
abandoned, were decided for claimant; 88.5 percent of appeals,
including those settled or abandoned, were unrepresented); Rubin,
The Appeals System, in 3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION,

UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

STUDIES

625, 628 (1980) (in a sample of 1979 cases,
claimant success rate was 30.8 percent; representation rate was
7.23 percent). Popkin, The Effect of Representationin Non-Adversary
Proceedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 989, 1024 (1977) (in a sample of 1974 cases, 20 percent
of the represented and 23 percent of the unrepresented claimants
succeeded at the reconsideration stage; 71 percent of the represented and 48 percent of the unrepresented claimants succeeded at
hearing stage).
To the extent that represented claimants succeed more
often, it is unclear whether they do so because advocacy strengthens their cases or because the representatives select out relatively
AND RESEARCH

unmeritorious cases.
16. When the Social Security Administration proposed to experiment
with an adversary format in which both the claimant and the
government would be represented, the proposal was perceived by
advocacy and old age groups as a disaster for claimants, in part
because of the heightened degree of formality it would entail. See
Review of Poverty Law 1979-1980: Welfare, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV.

934, 939 (Jan. 1981).

17. See G. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 237-79 (1971).
18. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy,and Class in the Welfare Sys-

tem, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW

2. Burden of Initiative
The strategic significance of procedural formality is to
encumber the intervention of state officials. The party most
harmed by the delay, expense and rigidity of formality is
usually the party with the burden of initiative to invoke the aid
of the state, the party disfavored by the short-term legal status
quo. 19
The anti-informalists seem to assume that the privileged
occupy this position more often than the poor. Yet, it seems at
least as plausible to suggest-as Marc Galanter has-that the
opposite is the case, that the privileged will usually be able to
maneuver the disadvantaged into situations in which the disadvantaged will have the burden of initiative. 20 Perhaps the safest
generalization is that the poor frequently find themselves both
in the position of appealing for intervention by state officials
and the position of resisting it. Procedural formality may
benefit tenants facing eviction, but it hurts tenants trying to get
the housing code enforcement agency to induce their landlords
to repair. The failure of affirmative housing code enforcement
often is attributed in substantial part to the delay and expense of
formal procedures for landlord prosecution. 2 ' Formality benefits

the poor frequently find themselves both
in the position of appealing for intervention
by state officials and resisting it.
...

unionized workers resisting dismissal under a regime entitling
them to remain at work until the employer has established good
cause, but it is a disaster for workers fired or denied employment on account of union activities under a regime permitting
the employer to discharge until the worker establishes an unfair
labor practice. Thus, critics argue that the delay and expense
resulting from the strategic use of procedural formality by
employers in unfair labor practice cases under the National
Labor Relations Act has substantially weakened the protection
of the Act. 22 And while procedural formality may benefit
disadvantaged people resisting criminal prosecution by the state,
it harms disadvantaged people who invoke the aid of the state to
secure protection against criminal activity.
What determines which party has the burden of initiative? To some extent, the answer involves the unreflective
perpetuation of traditional legal practices. To some extent, it
involves half-conscious cultural paradigms that portray certain
types of conduct (e.g., occupying property) as passive or

natural, and other types (e.g., disturbing possession) as active
or intervening. The paradigms put the burden on the "active"
party to seek the intervention of the state. To some extent, the
answer must refer to the interests of the people who most
influenced the formulation of the rules in question. From the
point of view of the informalism debate, however, the critical
point is that legal norms only minimally constrain the placing of
the burden of initiative. The legal culture permits most enforcement regimes to be designed so that the burden of initiative can
be placed on either party. This means that there are a variety of
ways of undercutting the strategic use of formality by the
disadvantaged without repudiating formality.
In Lazerson's account, the strategy of formality was
undercut by informalization, but it could also have been subverted
simply by shifting the burden of initiative. The most dramatic
way to do this would be to authorize landlord self-help: permit
the landlord to physically dispossess the tenant and give the
tenant the burden of initiating an action to regain possession.
During much of the heyday of the nineteenth-century commitment to the classical liberal rule of law, such self-help was
widely allowed. 23 In the 1978 case of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, the Supreme Court upheld against a due process challenge a self-help procedure allowing a warehouseman to foreclose his lien on a tenant's goods, stored by the landlord on
eviction, by selling them without judicial approval, leaving the
tenant with the burden of initiating a damages action to challenge the detention and sale. 24 States have abolished self-help
eviction by statute, and it may be that were they to reinstate it,
the Court would distinguish Flagg Brothers and hold the practice unconstitutional. 25 However, in this event, a legislature
trying to reverse the gains of the Lazerson strategy would have
available another approach that the Supreme Court has specifically held constitutional. In Lindsey v. Normet, 26 the Court
approved an Oregon statute that permitted the landlord to seek
possession in an expedited, but impeccably formal, procedure
in which the tenant was precluded from raising habitability as a
defense. The tenant was required to initiate her own damage
action, which would be heard after the landlord's action for
possession, in order to raise the habitability claim.
Of course, there may be political reasons that preclude
these approaches; landlords may lack the power to get them
enacted. But it is politics, and not the legal culture or norms of
formality, that prevent the landlords from doing so. On the
other hand, when landlords are in a position to impose their
will, a legal order committed to formality remains flexible
enough to accommodate them.
3. Relationship
Who bears the costs of procedural formality also depends on the nature of the relationship of the parties. Even

19. The party with the burden of initiative need not be plaintiff. For
example, when action by defendant is stayed or enjoined pendente
lite, much of the burden will be on defendant.
20. Galanter, Why the "'Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 122 (1974)
("repeat players" will typically maneuver themselves into the
"possessor position" to avoid burdens of delay).
21. E.g., Howe, Code Enforcement in San Francisco, 60 J.

URB.

L.

373 (1983).
22. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Worker's Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
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23. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 227, 229 (1980).
24. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
25. Perhaps on the ground that the importance of the interest at stake or
the potential for violence makes dispossession of a residential
tenant an inherently "state function" requiring a prior hearing.
Such arguments, however, have not been favored recently. See G.
GurIER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987-97 (10th ed. 1980).
26. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).

when an adversary bears them initially, he may b~e able to
reimpose them on the disadvantaged litigant or on other disadvantaged people. Crude economic analysis sometimes suggests
that this is always the case when the parties are in contractual
relationships. Although this claim goes much too far, it is
surely sometimes the case that the adversary can recover the
costs of procedural formality by charging tenants more or
paying workers less or engaging in lawful or unlawful discrimination against litigious tenants or workers. Moreover, when the
strategic use of procedural formality has large nonmonetary
costs, these costs are rarely borne solely by the adversary. This
kind of strategy often engenders alienation and antagonism that
may damage relationships that are valuable to the disadvantaged
claimant. This possibility seems most palpable when the disadvantaged person and the antagonist are participants in a longterm relation of some intimacy, such as husband and wife,
neighbors, landlord and tenant in an owner-occupied building,
employee and employer in a small business. The anti-informalists
remind us that most such relations are hierarchical and caution
us not to overvalue them. The material gains of adversarial
contest may well be worth the exacerbation of personal relations. Moreover, adversarial contest may lead to a long-run
improvement in personal relations, a kind of Hegelian "reintegration at a higher level" in which struggle makes it possible
for the parties to reconcile with a sense of dignity and mutual
respect that would formerly have been impossible. For example, it seems quite plausible that, in areas of the South where
civil rights conflict was most intense in the sixties, the personal
aspects of relations between the races are better than they were
before the conflict. But again, there is no reason to presume
that this usually will be the case. In some circumstances, the
antagonistic conflict fostered by formal procedures is simply
destructive. It subverts the kind of personal openness and direct
engagement that can lead to reconciliation and solidarity, even
in hierarchical relationships.

B. False Consciousness
So far, I have been concerned mainly with the first
theme of the new anti-informalism: the claim that informalism
deprives the disadvantaged of strategic advantage and material
gain. Lazerson does not suggest that his experience supports the
second claim that informalism subverts progressive conflict by
inducing a sense of false integration or resignation. It should be
apparent that, like the first one, this claim is plausible in some
circumstances but implausible as a general rule or presumption.
Formal procedures can also subvert conflict and induce acquiescence. They can do so by convincing the disadvantaged that
their losses are the result of a fair contest that gives everyone
her day in court. They can do so by making disadvantaged
litigants feel incompetent and powerless to conduct their affairs.
They can do so by making litigants feel dependent on professional helpers, who themselves vouch for the fairness of the
system.
Lazerson's case study not only fails to support the
second claim, it is a counterexample to it. The strategy of
procedural formality followed in the South Bronx was possible
because of one critical informal element in the system: the
provision of state-subsidized professional legal services to the
claimants. The lawyer-client relation is, of course, a paradig-

matically informal relation. The anti-informalist thesis suggests
that this type of relation should lead to the "cooling out" of
poor clients, that lawyers would use their discretion to reconcile
clients with landlords in return for merely token gains. Some
legal services have in fact been described as behaving that
way. 27 But the lawyers Lazerson describes behaved in the
opposite way.
In short, both informal and formal procedures can work
for and against the interests of the disadvantaged. How each
works in any given situation is likely to depend on far too many
particular circumstances to permit the kind of generalizations to
which the anti-informalists are drawn.

III. "State Power"
The anti-informalists seem to value procedural formality
for the same reason that classical liberals do: it constrains the
activities of the state. The anti-informalists describe informalizing
28
reforms as increasing "state power" or "social control,"terms they use more or less interchangeably and that for them
have unmistakably menacing connotations. While the classical
liberals feared the state as a threat to capitalism, some neo29
Marxists fear it as a servant of capitalism.
One problem with this approach is that terms like "state
power" have no clear reference. A central trait of contemporary
legal and political culture is its tendency to collapse the distinctions between public and private and coercion and choice. Both
the lawyers' debate over the scope of "state action" in constitutional law and the political theorists' debate about the meaning
of "power" reflect this phenomenon. The most penetrating
works in both debates have concluded that neither term can be
defined apart from controversial ethical and political judgments
and choices. 30 In order to identify a situation as involving
"state power," one needs an image of a non-state, uncoerced
situation with which to compare it. One needs an image of
prepolitical freedom.
For example, consider whether state power is extended
or restrained when a court enjoins racial discrimination on the
part of an employer. Does the court represent the state or does
the employer? The court is surely the state in the sense that
judges are officials. But many lawyers will tell you that the
employer is also the state because she is intensely regulated or
subsidized, or because she exercises an inherently public function, or simply because she makes use of the state-defined and
enforced regime of contract, property and torts. Is it power to
enjoin or not to enjoin? People who think that in a "natural"
condition of prepolitical freedom there would be no race discrimination will consider that when the court enjoins it has
merely prevented disruption by the employer and restored the
status quo ante. But people who think that in the condition of

27. Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 119 (1977).
28. Abel, supra note 5, at 270-79; Hofrichter, supra note 5, at 222-30.
29. See,

e.g.,

J.

O'CONNOR,

THE

FISCAL

CRISIS

OF THE

STATE

(1973), which is dedicated to "the workers, the unemployed, the
poor, the students, and others whose struggles against the state
have made this work possible."
30. See Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1296 (1982); S. LUKES, POWER-A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
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prepolitical freedom employers would be free to choose with
whom to contract will think that when the court enjoins it is
coercively intervening.
Terms like "state power" and "social control" usually
play a question-begging role in American political rhetoric.
Conservatives tend to speak of the state's activities in enforcing
traditional norms of contract and property as the vindication of
customary ground rules rather than as an assertion of power, but
the left often portrays this activity as coercive intervention.
Similarly, conservatives tend to speak of the federal government's activity in enforcing public law norms against state and
local governments as coercive intervention, while the left often
portrays this activity as vindicating customary ground rules. In
such instances, the difference between state power and prepolitical
freedom seems to depend simply on whether the person characterizing the practice approves of the practice in question.
Often the neo-Marxists seem to speak of the state in a
narrow ordinary language sense that refers simply to the activities of officials and public employees. Sometimes, they suggest
that such people act monolithically in advanced capitalism to
serve the interests of the dominant class. At other times, they
limit the suggestion to more specific circumstances. For example, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward argued that the
state acts in the interests of the poor only in response to
unorganized, disruptive protest by the poor; it acts in the
31
interest of the privileged as long as the poor are not disruptive.
It follows that in times of lower class passivity one cannot
expect initiatives of the state to benefit the poor, especially
initiatives such as informal dispute resolution mechanisms that
reduce the likelihood of disruptive protest. Lazerson appears to
have some similar thesis in mind when he writes:
If the social structure is not seriously threatened
and the ruling classes are firmly in control, the procedural fairness and blind, mechanical application of the
rules are the best defenses of the subordinate classes,
even if these rules were the instruments by which the
dominant classes came to power .... At other times,
when the forces of reaction are on the defensive and a
new social movement is contending for power,
proce32
dural formalism tends to inhibit change.
Some anti-informalists may feel that their views cannot
be characterized as holding that public officials monolithically
serve the interests of the privileged classes. But this is the only
theory of the state in which their explanation of informalization
as an extension of state power would be interesting. If the
officials did not monolithically serve the interests of a single
group, then characterizing their activity as state power would be
trivial or question-begging; the important issue would be, which
constituency within the state is responsible for the activity and
in whose interest is the activity undertaken?
Although I don't believe the anti-informalists cannot
reject the monolithic understanding of the state without altering
their interpretation of informalism, I don't believe they can
defend it plausibly either. No sooner had Piven and Cloward
articulated their version of the understanding, than events provided a striking counterexample. During the Nixon Administration, at a time when the disruptive protest of the sixties had

abated, welfare activities of the state expanded at a greater rate
than at any time since the New Deal. Public assistance benefits,
which had remained a constant fraction of the gross national
product since the New Deal, doubled from one to more than
two percent. During this time, there were also unusually large
and in some respects unprecedented increases in most of the
33
major social insurance, housing, and employment programs.
Some of this growth, particularly in the medical programs,
simply represented the expansion of initiatives taken during the
Democratic administrations of the sixties, but a large part of 34it
was due to new initiatives, several by the Nixon Administration.
Indeed, at a time when the urban riots had abated and the
popular mobilization dimensions of the civil rights and welfare
rights movements were nearly extinct, the Nixon Administration proposed the most progressive welfare reform ever pro35
posed by an American president-4he Family Assistance Plan.
Once one acknowledges that the state, rather than being
monolithic, is made up of a variety of constituencies and is
responsive, although in varying degrees, to many interests, it is
not hard to think of conditions other than disruptive protest that
might prompt reforms beneficial to the poor. For example,
welfare activities that benefit the poor may benefit important
non-poor constituencies. As neo-conservatives point out, welfare expansion benefits elite professionals and the publicly
employed working class as well as the poor. Alternatively,
factions within the dominant class may find it in their interest to
appeal to and mobilize the poor in the course of struggles with
competing factions. This type of appeal is most readily associated
with right-wing corporatist regimes, such as Peronist Argentina,
but it is not confined to them. One can find more modest
illustrations in the machine politics of turn-of-the-century
America. 36 And some suggest that Nixon's progressive welfare
initiatives were prompted by an ambition to establish the
Republican party as the majority party on corporatist lines. Like
Reagan, but with considerably
more justice, Nixon analogized
37
himself to Roosevelt.
Things do not improve when the social theorist tries to
follow the lead of the constitutional lawyer and abandons
ordinary language notions of the state to argue that nominally
private parties, as well as officials, represent the state. 3' At this
point, the claim that the state acts against the interests of the
disadvantaged is likely to become tautological. The state ends
up getting defined in terms of whatever activities the theorist
thinks are against the interests of the disadvantaged. Thus, Abel
assumes that federally subsidized poverty lawyers in the South

33. See C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
1950-1980 48-50 (1984).
34. Especially important were the transformation of the food stamp
program and the dramatic increase in social security benefits. See
D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 116-24
(1973); E. TuFrE, POLrICAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY 29-44
(1978).
35. The proposal died under the fire of both conservatives and liberals
who apparently could not believe that a progressive reform could
emerge from the Nixon Adminisration. See generally D. MOYNIAN,
supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., C. ADAMS & H. ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE (1886).

31. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING
32. Lazerson, supra note 5, at 195.
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37. D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 34, at 204-05, 359.

38. Abel, supra note 5, at 271-72.
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Bronx are not agents of state power but argues that federally
subsidized mediators in the Neighborhood Justice Program are
39
agents of state power.

IV. The Political Significance of Formality
One way of interpreting the recent debate over informalization would see it as a turn in the dialectic of formality
and equity or solidarity that runs throughout modem legal
thought.' On the one hand, formality is valued as protection
against the danger that collective activity will be oppressive. On
the other hand, formality is resisted because it inhibits progressive as well as regressive collective activity. It precludes the
tailoring of decisions to particular circumstances that is necessary to achieve important kinds of fairness, freedom, efficiency,
and solidarity. From this perspective, the question of formality
turns most basically on the degree of faith in collective activity,
and trust in the people engaged in it. Of course, "collective
activity" is no more self-defining or homogeneous a term than
"state power." What people will perceive as collective activity
will vary, and their degree of faith and trust will vary widely
among activities so perceived. Since attitudes toward different
collective activities will turn on the particular circumstances of
specific activities, there can be no categorical resolution to the
question of formality.
Putting the matter this way raises the question of what
the particular circumstances are that account for the configuration of positions in the contemporary informalization debate. I
think that an adequate understanding of the informalism debates
has to look to some of the distinctive features of the liberal
politics of the sixties and seventies. 4 1 Although the new antiinformalism seems a departure from the traditional left critique
of formality, it seems generally consistent with the liberal legal
activism of the past two decades. If the left had generally
attacked formality in the Progressive and New Deal eras, it
discovered some of formality's virtues in the sixties and seventies. The civil rights, welfare rights, and criminal justice movements all focused on the dangers of the abuse of state power
and appealed to formality as a way of checking them.

An adequate understanding of the
informalism debates must look to some of
the distinctive features of the liberal politics
of the sixties and seventies.
Now in one respect this belated appeal to formality
might seem paradoxical. The liberal turn to formality occurred
at a time when the state had become, not only most responsive
to the concerns of the working class, but its most important

39. Id. at 271, 279-93, 308.
40. See R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 203-16 (1976).

41. The argument of the remainder of this section is expanded and
illustrated in Simon, supra note 18.

employer. 42 But the paradox disappears when one recognizes
that much of the legal activism of this period was concerned
less with the interests of the securely employed working class
than with the interests of elite professionals and the poor.
Indeed, formality was typically invoked to increase the control
of judges and upper level administrators over the lower tier
public work force in order to make the latter more responsive to
the poor. It is only a slight exaggeration to characterize the
activism of this period as efforts by elite professionals to protect
the poor from the working class. Of course, this feature of legal
reform is an instance of the broader tendency of recent liberal
politics to bypass, and ultimately alienate, the working class.
Formality in the liberal legal literature has meant control
through rules, not of state officials or the powerful generally,
but of the publicly employed working class. The type of
collective action in which this literature expresses a loss of faith
and distrust is the activity of the lower and, to some extent,
middle-tier public officials. At the same time that the liberals
were arguing that the rule of law required a regime of formality
to protect against the abuse of power by police officers, welfare
workers and school principals, they were arguing that the rule
of law required a regime of informality to facilitate the responsible exercise of power by federal judges and, more grudgingly,
state judges and upper tier administrators. Indeed, the purpose
of subjecting lower tier officials to regimes of formality was
usually to facilitate control of them by elite judges and officials.
Whatever plausibility the more extreme anti-informalist
arguments have derives from the fact that they resonate with the
rhetorical tradition of the activist successes of the sixties and
seventies. The assumptions about class in this liberal rhetoric
seem consistent, for example, with Lazerson's South Bronx
case study. At the beginning of Lazerson's story, the officials
portrayed as unworthy of trust and in need of the discipline of
formality are the lowest status state judges. In the class vision
of recent liberal jurisprudence, state judges occupy an intermediate position between the totally untrustworthy street-level
officials and the totally trustworthy federal judges. But the most
43
frequently expressed attitude toward state judges is distrust,
and one would surely expect this to be the case with municipal

42. By the late seventies, about 17 percent of the work force was in
public employment. Freeman, The Evolution of the American
Labor Market 1948-1980, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY iN
TRANSINON 349, 364 (M. Feldstein ed. 1980).
43. In a rare passage that makes explicit the premises of liberal
jurisprudence regarding class, Burt Neuboume writes:
The federal bench is an elite, prestigious body, drawn primarily
from a successful, homogeneous socioeducational class-a class
strongly imbued with the philosophical values of Locke and
Mill (which the Bill of Rights in large measure tracks). As
such, when a plaintiff asserts a constitutional claim against a
state official whose socioeducational background does not include obeisance to that libertarian tradition, a federal judge will
generally protect the threatened constitutional value.
... And since a class disparity between federal trial
judges and the individual targets of constitutional enforcement
is more likely than one between state trial judges and constitutional defendants, this phenomenon will assist the constitutional plaintiff more often in the federal courts.
Neubourne, The Myth of Parity, 90
(1977).
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court trial judges. And the impression of disaster one gets from
Lazerson's account of reform arises, not simply from the loss of
opportunities for the strategic exploitation of formality, but
from the fact that the judges have been replaced by even lower
status and less trustworthy administrative officials. On the
other hand, the professional class is represented in the account
by legal services lawyers, who are portrayed as entirely trustworthy and exempt from concerns about formality. '
Lazerson's political assumptions seem plausible in the
case he describes, but as a general political strategy the liberal
program has drawbacks that have recently become all too
evident. Since formality is not self-enforcing, the liberal strategy of formality depends on liberal control of the judiciary or
upper administrative offices. As liberal control over these of-

fices has weakened in the past decade, formality has increasingly been pressed into the service of goals hostile to the interest of
the poor. Moreover, I think the liberal strategy has overestimated
the extent to which formality could ever enable upper tier
officials to control the practice of a lower tier work force
alienated from the goals of those at the top. By portraying low
status public workers as incarnations of a reified monolithic
menace such as "state power" or "social control," liberal
jurisprudence and its neo-Marxist variants have encouraged
reforms that alienated these workers from claimants and discouraged reforms that might have promoted more responsible
lower tier practice and made possible political alliances between
workers and claimants.

V. Conclusion
44. Many would regard municipal court judges as occupying a higher
social status than legal services lawyers, but I think the opposite is

the dominant view within the liberal professional class. In terms of
family background, education and worldview, legal services lawyers are probably closer than lower tier judges to the elite professional ranks.
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The new anti-informalism plays a valuable role when it
shows how much more complex conditions are than the proponents of many informalizing reforms suppose. It is less helpful
when it turns naive informalism on its head to create a nightmare image that is just as fanciful and misleading.

